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EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
Bribery and corruption in international business are now priority concerns for most 
developed nation-states. This is particularly the case for those OECD countries with 
large shares of world exports, as international conventions, such as the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention that came into force in 1999 and the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption that came into force in 2005, have sought to harmonise legal and 
normative anti-bribery standards, rules and enforcement. Alongside these ambitious legal 
frameworks, we are now seeing many ostensibly ‘respectable’, global corporate elites being 
implicated in the bribery of public and private officials, internationally and domestically. For 
most corporations operating transnationally, the threat of enforcement action is real given 
the increasing trend towards the introduction of domestic criminal law frameworks with 
extra-jurisdictional reach.
The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 remains the most active enforcement arena, 
with international companies regularly agreeing large financial penalties since the early 
2000s, but with the underlying threat of criminal prosecution. In the UK, the introduction 
and enforcement of the Section 7 offence of the Bribery Act 2010 concerning the ‘Failure of 
Commercial Organisations to Prevent Bribery’ has reinforced the necessity for corporations 
operating multi-jurisdictionally to implement ‘adequate procedures’ to prevent bribery 
throughout their organisational structure. The UK Ministry of Justice’s Guidance document 
provides an indication of procedures and principles that could be put in place by relevant 
commercial organisations to prevent persons associated with them from bribing, and we 
have seen the publication of guidelines (for varying purposes) by several non-governmental 
organisations to aid in this process. However, what ‘adequate procedures’ actually look 
like remains unclear, as only one case has been contested in the courts. In France, the 
anti-bribery landscape has shifted with the coming into force of Sapin II in 2017, which 
incorporates a prescriptive requirement for companies of a certain size to implement 
appropriate compliance systems. Extra-territorial enforcement possibilities also exist in 
Germany where, once it is established that the corrupt act took place at least partly in 
German territory, jurisdiction may be extended to foreign accomplices acting abroad.
How businesses respond in this enforcement climate is crucial, both in terms of reducing 
opportunities for bribery, but also in terms of any interactions with regulators that might 
take place. When businesses are implicated in such (transnational) bribery, it means the 
company or its employees, intermediaries, subsidiaries or agents, have engaged in an 
illicit relation of exchange for the company’s benefit. That is, the company or its associated 
persons offer, promise or give an advantage (usually financial, but not always) with the 
3explicit intention to win or maintain business, though such bribes may also be extorted. 
Businesses need to be prepared for those scenarios where bribery may take place within 
their organisational structures. 
To inform the debate on the increasing anti-bribery requirements faced by global 
commercial organisations, and provide a more nuanced understanding of business 
practices ‘on the ground’, this research aimed to develop empirical insights, based on 
a survey of over 250 business actors, into the organisational, cultural and structural 
conditions that are conducive to bribery in order to: 
• Assist commercial organisations in understanding the potential risks behind 
certain business practices or certain types of associated persons; 
• Enable internal compliance officers and external legal counsel to provide 
empirically-informed advice on relevant preventative procedures, due diligence 
practices, internal compliance procedures, training etc.; and 
• Enable the development of evidence-based compliance of commercial 
organisations with the requirements of anti-bribery provisions and enable 
companies to ‘benchmark’ their approach in contrast to comparable global 
businesses.
KEY FINDINGS
• One in five respondents indicated that their company does not have a formal policy 
on anti-bribery and corruption. Of those companies that do have a formal anti-bribery 
and corruption (ABC) policy, there are indicators of good corporate practice in terms of 
accompanying training provision.
• 76% of respondents indicated that senior management in their company mainly 
approaches ABC through establishing a ‘code of conduct’. However, beyond this 
approach, there is little consensus about what might be considered an ‘ideal’ approach 
by senior management. Further investigation and guidance is needed to establish a set 
of benchmarks for senior management teams.
• If bribery is suspected, employees are mostly likely to notify their direct managers in 
the first instance, rather than their peers or external actors, such as the regulators. 
This makes the relationships between direct managers and employees central to 
engendering pro-social, ethical ABC corporate environments. While the ABC discourse 
frequently promotes the ‘tone from the top’ as central to ABC within business, it is likely 
that ‘the tone from the middle’ is more fundamental to operationalising effective ABC. 
• 30% of respondents - almost one in three - considered it likely that someone in their 
company would get away with paying a bribe on behalf of their company.
• Although three quarters of respondents expect employees to face some kind of 
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consequences for involvement in bribery, 50 out of the 252 respondents (ca. 20%) believe the 
employee would get away with it, either because it would not be discovered (12%) or because 
management allows it (8%). Furthermore, of those respondents who expected employees 
that bribe to face consequences, 32% did not indicate that employees within their company 
would be dismissed for involvement in bribery. In other words, almost one in three of these 
respondents do not think an employee implicated in bribery would be dismissed.
• 39% of respondents in non-legal/compliance roles (i.e. sales, marketing etc.) indicate that they 
think it would be definitely or probably possible for someone in their role to offer a bribe to a 
public official for preferential treatment. That is, almost two out of five respondents in these 
positions recognise opportunities for bribery in the course of their roles. This indicates that 
conducive structures for bribery exist in businesses. Of these respondents, 40% indicated 
that opportunities for bribery arise routinely during existing business relationships. This is an 
important finding as it reinforces that bribery does not take place outside of ‘normal business 
practice’, exposing company insiders to bribery opportunities on a daily basis.
• When asked which factors present the main bribery risks to their companies, our respondents 
across compliance and sales roles indicated that working in countries where bribery is 
common is the main concern, followed by using agents or consultants and the use of 
corporate hospitality, gifts and entertainment. This finding corresponds with the extant 
literature and enforcement data on foreign bribery where we see local cultures, third parties 
and the ambiguity surrounding hospitality as concerns for business.
• An overwhelming majority of respondents (80%) believe it is never acceptable to bribe. 
However, although a small proportion, it is interesting to note that some respondents believe 
it to be always acceptable to bribe (3%), believe it can be acceptable if it helps get new 
business (6%), or believe it is not acceptable but cannot be avoided (11%).
• The use of third parties and bribery risks: 48% of respondents who are involved in engaging 
third parties in a business context (i.e. individuals in business roles) do not often or never 
think about bribery risks when doing so. This indicates that, while there may be a general 
understanding that using agents or consultants poses bribery risks, in practice, company 
insiders do not always check for bribery risks in specific cases of engaging them. There should 
be a focus on developing internal company procedures to bridge this gap and target the 
policies and guidance on third party risks to the most critical areas of the company structure.   
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1. ANTI-BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
There is much empirical evidence that ‘culture corrupts’1;  
that a corporation’s institutional context and culture can 
produce an environment that encourages, colludes in, 
or is culpably blind to law-breaking2  and thus provides 
the means, setting, rationale and opportunity for the 
behaviours3.  Organisational culture incorporates the 
autonomous elements beyond individual actors, that is, 
it provides a lens through which we can understand the 
influence of macro-institutional forces outside of the 
organisation on individual decisions and actions located 
within corporate structures, goals and processes4. 
For businesses operating globally, it is important to ensure 
anti-bribery and corruption policies and systems are in place 
in order to i. reduce opportunities for employees to engage 
in bribery transactions, ii. make certain that employees 
know how to correctly respond should such opportunities 
arise, and iii. provide a robust (legal) defence should the 
gaze of the enforcement authorities be turned upon their 
commercial activities. Most respondents (71%) in our survey 
indicated that their companies have a formal policy on anti-
bribery and corruption. However, almost one in five (19%) 
of respondents indicated their company does not have a 
formal policy on anti-bribery and corruption (Chart 1). This 
represents a significant proportion of our sample.
1.1 Companies with no formal ABC policy
The companies of those who responded ‘no’ are based in a 
range of industries (Manufacturing 32%; Construction 28%; 
Technology 11%; Logistics 6%; Financial Services 4%; Real 
Estate 4%; Pharma/Healthcare 2%; Defence 2%) and tended 
to have a smaller annual turnover (49% work for companies 
with turnover of less $10million, 30% for companies with 
turnover between $10million-$100milion, 11% for companies 
with turnover between $100million-$1billion and 4% for 
companies with turnover between $1billion-$10billion). 
Though many of the companies without a formal ABC policy 
are at the lower end of the scale in terms of turnover, it is 
particularly surprising that some large companies did not 
have a formal ABC policy. This finding is not industry-specific, 
as we discovered examples of large companies without 
formal ABC policies across sectors: a company in the defence 
sector with more than 50,000 employees, a compliance team 
of more than 100 people and operates in most regions of 
the world; a US-based company in the pharmaceuticals/
healthcare industry with an annual turnover between 
$1billion-$10billion; a large provider of alternative financial 
services. This finding indicates that perceptions of the 
necessity of a formal ABC policy might be influenced by 
company-specific factors rather than industry- or regulation-
specific ones. 
1.2 Companies with a formal ABC policy
Of the 178 (71%) respondents that work in companies with a 
formal ABC policy, the vast majority (97%) have clear access 
to the policy – they either have a copy themselves, can 
directly access a copy, or can request it from another person 
within the organisation.
Respondents who work in companies with a formal ABC 
policy were asked to rate how well they thought they knew 
the policy on a scale of 1 (don’t know it at all) to 5 (know 
it completely). 162 (91%) of the respondents rated their 
knowledge at 3 or above, showing an overall confidence in 
their level of knowledge in the policy.
Chart 2 shows the percentage of respondents whose 
companies have a formal ABC policy, and who showed 
confidence in their level of knowledge, who said that the 
following points were covered in the policy.
As we might expect, a substantial majority of these 
respondents (96%) indicated that their company’s formal 
ABC policies communicate that bribery is prohibited. Areas 
least covered by the policies were rules on donations to 
charitable causes, the requirement of due diligence on third 
parties, and the need to enter gifts/entertainment/hospitality 
on a register. It is encouraging that a significant number 
include policies covering procedures for whistleblowing as 
well as the prohibition of facilitation payments.
7Does your company have a formal policy on anti-bribery and 
corruption?
Chart 1
Are the following points covered by your company’s ABC policy?
Chart 2
1.3 ABC training
Ensuring that an ABC policy is in place and accessible to 
employees is of course important. However, for such policies 
to be translated into actual practice, it is vital that companies 
provide robust training. This ensures that core ethical ABC 
narratives become embedded in the daily working practices of 
those employees that may encounter bribery and corruption. 
We asked those respondents that work in companies that do 
have ABC policies to provide further insights into the training 
that they receive (Chart 3).
Have you been given training on your company’s ABC policy?
Chart 3:
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When did you receive 
training on your company’s 
ABC policy?
Chart 4
n the last 12 months, how 
many times have you 
received training on the ABC 
policy?
Chart 5
Does the training involve 
questions testing you on your 
understanding of the policy?
Chart 6
9The majority of respondents (91%) whose company has an 
ABC policy had been given training on the policy. 67% of 
those received training on the ABC policy when they started 
at the company, 33% received training when they had taken 
up a new role, 23% received training after an enforcement 
activity on their own or another company, and 19% (31 
respondents) received training on the ABC policy following 
the introduction of new legislation. Of the respondents who 
received training following enforcement activity, all are from 
companies headquartered in the US or Europe: 18 (58%) 
headquartered in USA; 5 (16%) headquartered in UK; 3 
(10%) headquartered in France; with the remaining 5 (16%) 
headquartered in Austria, Netherlands or Germany. This 
may be an indicator of how sensitive companies from the US 
and Europe currently are to the global enforcement climate, 
particularly given the most stringent ABC laws emanate from 
these regions.
For instance, there has been a recent but steady trend 
towards increased regulation and enforcement in the anti-
bribery sphere. The trend was historically spearheaded 
by the US, which at the federal level, under the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), does not have specific laws 
on commercial bribery, but regulates it indirectly by 
requiring ‘issuers’ to ensure accuracy in the reporting of 
their accounts. The extraterritorial reach of the legislation 
is evidenced in the broad definition of “issuers”: companies 
that list on a US stock exchange, regardless of main location 
of business5 .  This means that global corporations can be 
held liable under US law solely for the fact that their stocks 
are trading on, for example, NYSE. In addition, whenever 
US jurisdiction applies, the company's officers, directors, 
employees, agents or stockholders acting on its behalf 
anywhere in the world can be prosecuted6. 
The regulatory zeal has also been transposed into 
actual enforcement actions. In fact, 2016 was the most 
successful year in FCPA history with record numbers 
of both enforcement actions against companies and 
individuals, and of overall amounts paid to resolve them 
in settlements brokered by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
($2.48bn)7.  The trend continued in 2017, when a smaller 
number of companies than in 2016 paid almost the same 
amount in penalties ($1.92bn)8.  In addition, the DOJ is 
continuously introducing innovative enforcement actions 
and programmes such as, for example, the declinations 
with disgorgement - a new category of enforcement action 
created as part of the DOJ's Pilot Program.
Respondents were also asked how many times they had 
received training on their company’s ABC policy in the last 12 
months, and whether the training they had received involved 
being tested on their understanding of the policy (Chart 5). 
Almost half of these respondents (46%) indicated that they 
had received training once in the last 12 months, while 84% 
had received training once or more in the last 12 months. 
16% indicated they had not received any training in the last 
12 months. 
When we further probed respondents on the training they 
receive, and in particular whether the training involves 
questions testing them on their understanding of the policy, 
89% indicated that they had been tested in this way (Chart 
6). 59% indicated they are tested each time they receive 
training. Furthermore, to complete the ABC training they 
are required to pass a corresponding test (Chart 7). The 
respondents found the training to be useful in helping them 
understand ABC policies; this is an important takeaway for 
designing internal corporate ABC practices.
The survey data indicate that there is good corporate 
practice in terms of providing ABC training. Establishing 
a pro-social corporate culture is fundamental to ensuring 
an ethical climate exists. This culture must communicate 
clear and concise anti-bribery and anti-corruption norms 
and values, and ensure that employees are fully socialised 
into these ways of thinking. One part of institutionalising 
these belief systems is by developing robust policies and 
procedures that become part of the fabric of the business 
environment. 
Do you have to pass the test 
in order to complete the 
training?
Chart 7
Did you find the training use-
ful in helping you understand 
the policy?
Chart 8
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1.4 Nature and scope of internal compliance functions
It is well established that those businesses that are best 
prepared for dealing with anti-bribery and corruption risks 
have installed effective, well-functioning and extensive 
internal compliance systems and structures. We asked 
respondents to provide insights into the nature and scope of 
internal compliance functions within their companies (Chart 
9). 76% of our respondents indicated that their company 
has a compliance officer or equivalent. 17% of respondents’ 
companies, almost one in five, did not have a compliance 
officer or equivalent.
Of those companies that did have compliance functions, 
the size of the compliance teams varied from one person to 
more than 100 people (Chart 10). The category with the most 
responses (45%) was 2-10 people.  Given the global nature 
of the companies in the sample, we asked the respondents 
where their company’s legal and compliance functions were 
based, and whether responsibility was at the global, or local/
country level (Chart 11). 47% of respondents indicated that 
their company’s legal/compliance functions were based 
within the company headquarters (global responsibility), 17% 
were based at the country-level offices (local responsibility), 
while 34% indicated the legal/compliance function was based 
at both company headquarters (global) and country level 
(local).
Legal and compliance functions that have global oversight 
can ensure a consistent and harmonised response towards 
anti-bribery and corruption across a company’s business 
operations. A centralised narrative can ensure key ideas 
are coherently communicated across regional officers. 
However, legal and compliance functions that are based 
within local offices can be more flexible, tailored and be 
able to respond with celerity, should urgent issues arise. 
There are advantages to both approaches. There is no one-
size-fits-all model in this sense, however, the global aspect 
to business operations and the trend of foreign bribery 
enforcement should be key factors in the development 
of ABC systems. These have multiple consequences for 
global commercial organisations. First, global organisations 
increasingly find themselves simultaneously under the 
regulation and oversight of regulatory and criminal justice 
bodies from multiple jurisdictions. This may impose 
challenges for global corporates to properly interpret legal 
demands in particular countries. It also exposes them to 
hazards when cooperating with a regulator in one country 
of a potential ‘cascade’ enforcement action in another 
country. Second, the availability of any defence of ‘adequate 
[corporate governance] procedures' in offences of failure 
to prevent bribery will be shaped by the increasingly 
globalised corporate governance environment. This 
multiplies the challenges of appropriate interpretation of 
regulatory demands across different jurisdictions. These 
problems exemplify the importance of understanding how 
relationships between corporations and regulators develop 
in practice, as well as the types of advice that are sought in 
such circumstances. 
Does your company have a compliance officer or equivalent?
Chart 9
How large is the compliance team in your company?
Chart 10
Where are the company’s legal/compliance functions based?
Chart 11
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1.5 Monitoring ABC compliance
Respondents were asked about the extent to which their 
organisations monitored compliance with ABC policies 
and procedures (Chart 12). Those that indicated that their 
organisations attempted to monitor compliance at least 
some of the time were asked how the companies did this 
(Chart 13). 80% of the respondents indicated that their 
organisation attempts to monitor compliance with ABC 
policies and procedures to some extent. 41% indicated 
that such monitoring took place ‘all of the time’ while 21% 
indicated that it took place ‘most of the time’. Only 5% of 
respondents indicated that monitoring never took place. This 
indicates a high level of monitoring within the companies in 
our sample.
Our respondents indicated that the monitoring is mainly 
done internally or by internal teams. 60% of the respondents 
who indicated that their organisations attempt to monitor 
compliance said that an internal audit team would be 
involved in checking for anti-bribery breaches; 58% said that 
an internal legal/compliance team would check for anti-
bribery breaches.
The proportion of respondents that indicated that an 
external team of auditors or lawyers would monitor their 
company’s compliance with ABC policies and procedures was 
much lower. Of those respondents that indicated that their 
company attempts to monitor compliance, 26% indicated 
that an external team of auditors carries out checks for anti-
bribery breaches while 11% indicated that an external team 
of lawyers would provide this function. It seems likely that 
only larger companies would have access to external teams 
of lawyers or auditors, given the costs involved in contracting 
external expertise. Interestingly, one of the comments made 
by a respondent who selected ‘other’ was that there would 
be an ‘annual signing of the ABC policy’. This symbolic and 
ritualistic process may encourage compliant behaviour 
within organisations, given employees actively, rather than 
passively, engage with the ABC agenda. However, as a means 
of ensuring ABC compliance it is not sufficient to base the 
monitoring solely on employees’ ‘statements’ without third-
party verification of compliance staff, auditors or external 
consultants. These provide an independent assessment of 
the level of compliance as well as potential action-plans to 
correct any deficiencies. 
How often does your organisation attempt to monitor compliance with ABC policies and 
procedures?
Chart 12
In which of the following ways does your organisation attempt to monitor compliance with 
ABC policies and procedures?
Chart 13
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1.6 Management commitment to / support for ABC
Respondents were asked how committed they felt the 
senior management in their companies and their direct 
managers were to anti-bribery and corruption (Chart 14). 
They were asked to evaluate this commitment on a scale of 
1 to 5, where 1 = not committed at all and 5 = completely 
committed. Our respondents indicated that the senior 
management and direct managers in their companies were 
mostly completely committed to ABC. This is a good sign 
given the significance of the ‘tone from the top’ in generating 
corporate cultures that clearly and consistently challenge 
bribery and corruption.
To follow up, respondents were asked about the ways 
in which senior management approached anti-bribery 
and corruption in their company (Chart 15). Primarily, 
respondents indicated that senior management approached 
ABC through putting in place a code of conduct, with over 
three-quarters of respondents selecting this option. Beyond 
this approach, senior management adopts a range of 
responses in practice to communicate their commitment 
to ABC compliance. These include messages addressed to 
both external (e.g. statements on the company website) and 
internal stakeholders (e.g. messages and warnings on ABC 
compliance sent out to staff and ABC topics as Board-level 
items for discussion). In fewer cases, senior management 
conveys ABC commitment through disciplining noncompliant 
staff – either through internal company procedures or 
through firing them. Respondents who selected ‘other’ 
highlighted online training and testing (4 respondents) and 
through a Managers’ Conference (1 respondent). Only a 
very small number (6 respondents) stated that there was 
no approach by senior management to anti-bribery and 
corruption within their company.
Respondents were also asked whether senior management 
supported and reinforced anti-bribery and corruption 
initiatives introduced by the compliance team (Chart 16). 
The majority of respondents (72%) stated that they did. 
Overall, the findings indicate that there is a range of activities 
that senior management can adopt that convey their 
commitment to ABC compliance – the companies with ‘best 
practice’ are likely to be the ones that employ most or all of 
these approaches.
How committed are senior management and your direct manager(s) to ABC?
Chart 14
In which of the following ways does senior management approach anti-bribery and 
corruption?
Chart 15
Does senior management support and reinforce anti-bribery and corruption initiatives 
introduced by the compliance team?
Chart 16
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1.7 Reporting bribery
Previous survey research has shown that self-reporting of 
instances of bribery is the most common method through 
which law enforcement detects corruption. For example, the 
survey conducted for the OECD Report, found that two thirds 
of all instances of bribery that come to the attention of law 
enforcement are made through self-reporting. In addition, 
in a survey of over 400 companies, the US Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC) found that most of the companies 
voluntarily reported paying out well in excess of $300 
million in corporate funds to foreign government officials, 
politicians, and political parties. These corporations have 
included some of the largest and most widely held public 
companies and over 117 of them rank in the top Fortune 500 
industries9.  
While these surveys reveal insights on company-regulator 
reporting relationships, we aimed to explore how internal 
reporting processes operate – a relatively unknown issue. 
We therefore asked questions specifically on who would the 
respondent notify first in various scenarios when bribery was 
paid. Respondents in roles other than legal or compliance 
roles were asked about who they would notify in the first 
instance if they suspected a bribe had been paid by one of 
their co-workers or had been paid or authorised by their 
direct manager (Chart 17 & 18). 
Respondents indicated that if they suspected a bribe had 
been paid by one of their co-workers, in the first instance 
they would be most inclined to raise the issue with their 
direct manager (33%) or both their manager and the 
compliance/legal function (24%), rather than with a peer 
(4%) or a regulator (2%), for example. This is an important 
insight into how employees would respond as their first 
point of contact for reporting is more likely to be their direct 
manager, rather than a senior manager. 
While the previous section outlined the importance of the 
‘tone from the top’ in terms of framing the ABC policies and 
cultures within the organisation, it might be argued that 
in operationalising these policies it is the ‘tone from the 
middle’ that is central to the ABC response. The relationships 
that employees have with their immediate managers are 
key to ABC. It is the nature of these interactions between 
employees and direct mangers (i.e. how frequently they 
Who would you notify in the first instance if you suspect a bribe has been paid by one of your co-workers?
Chart 17
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interact, the duration of these interactions, the intensity of 
these interactions, the priority of these interactions) that 
dictate employee behaviour. In other words, employees 
can associate with their direct managers in different ways, 
but these associations have a symbolic meaning as ways 
of behaving and thinking are learned in this way. How 
employees are socialised into corporate environments 
determines the motives, attitudes and rationalisations 
they develop. As direct managers are the first point of 
contact within the organisation, these relationships are 
fundamental to engendering pro-social, ethical working 
environments. However, while these relationships are key, 
it is important that direct managers will do something with 
this information when this happens.
In general terms, we can also see that reporting is more 
likely to be internal than external. This is a good indicator 
of functioning internal compliance systems, as it is 
important for any suspected bribery to be raised internally 
in the first instance. A preference for immediately notifying 
the enforcement authorities, or other external actors, 
would indicate a lack of trust or confidence in the internal 
reporting mechanisms. However, 6% also indicated 
that they would not notify anyone. It is important for 
businesses to ensure that their employees know to report 
suspected bribery internally.
If it were the respondent’s manager that was implicated in the 
bribery, reporting again remains internal, but respondents are 
more likely to notify the compliance or legal department (39%) 
or the senior management/the Board (37%). The respondents 
that selected ‘senior management/the Board’ as the first point 
of notification did not commonly come from companies that do 
not have compliance team or have a small compliance team. 
While 24 respondents (36%) had no compliance officer or team 
to turn to, or didn’t know if they do, the rest (64%) either had a 
single compliance officer or a compliance team of at least two 
people, with eight (12%) having a compliance team of over 50 
people. 
As with Chart 17, this preference for internal reporting in the 
first instance is an indicator of trust and confidence within 
the organisation, its compliance function and/or its senior 
management. However, 8% of respondents indicated they would 
not notify anyone in this scenario.
Who would you notify in the first instance if you suspect a bribe has been paid or authorised by your direct manager?
Chart 18
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1.8 Detecting bribery
Issues of capable guardianship are crucial in preventing 
bribery opportunities being acted on in the business 
context. In the literature, capable guardians are defined 
as the actor or mechanism that can disrupt, either directly 
or indirectly, the ability of a motivated offender to engage 
with an opportunity for crime, in this case bribery.   Capable 
guardians here include the company’s own compliance 
policies and oversight, and a range of third parties with some 
stake in the oversight and control of business transactions, 
and with certain responsibilities in detecting suspicious 
activities. In this question we explored the relative roles 
of a range of internal and external actors in detecting 
bribery10. These insights enable a better understanding of 
the behaviour upon detecting an internal irregularity, and a 
better management of the relationship with guardians.
Chart 25 relates to the likelihood of members of certain 
groups within the organisation to detect bribes. Of our 
respondents,
• 75% indicated that it is likely that compliance personnel 
would detect bribes
• 70% indicated that it is likely that external auditors would 
detect bribes
• 67% indicated that it is likely that contracts and 
expansion personnel would detect bribes
• 64% indicated that it is likely that regulators would detect 
bribes
• 62% indicated that it is likely that sales personnel would 
detect bribes
• 58% indicated that it is likely that their law firm would 
detect bribes
Our respondents indicated that they consider compliance 
personnel (75%) most likely to detect bribes within their 
organisation, followed by external auditors (70%) and 
contracts and expansion personnel (67%). The importance 
of external auditors and law firms in this context should 
be considered against the previous finding that many 
companies do not employ these external parties to conduct 
checks of ABC breaches. This further emphasises the 
importance of internal compliance staff as the main actors in 
detecting bribery and the need to invest into hiring adequate 
staff in these roles. 
It can also be seen that, in general, the majority of 
respondents considered it likely that each of these groups 
would detect bribes in their organisation. This is noteworthy 
as perceptions of detection can be important in deterring 
corrupt behaviour, even if the reality of detection is different.
How likely is it that members of the following groups would detect bribes?
Chart 19
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1.9 Responding to bribery
Respondents were asked what they thought would 
happen to an employee at their company if they were to 
become involved in bribery (Chart 20). Three quarters of 
the respondents expected employees to face some kind 
of consequences for involvement in bribery. This is an 
encouraging number as it indicates that bribery breaches 
are commonly taken seriously by company management. 
However, the data show that, while the majority believe that 
employees would face consequences for becoming involved 
in bribery, 50 out of the 252 respondents (20%) believe 
they would get away with it, either because it would not be 
discovered (12%) or because management allows it (8%). 6% 
of our respondents think that the employee would be asked 
to stop but that no formal action would be taken. 
Furthermore, we asked these respondents what kind of 
consequences the employee would face, should they be 
implicated in bribery (Chart 21). Of note is that 60 out of 
the 187 (32%) did not indicate that employees within their 
company would be dismissed for involvement in bribery, 
signalling that a bribery breach is not considered a serious 
enough cause for termination of employment. However, 75% 
did think that the employee would face investigation and 
potential disciplinary action by their company. Furthermore, 
58% thought that the employee would face investigation 
and potential enforcement action by the authorities which 
indicates that there are perceptions of certainty of detection 
and reaction by formal enforcement bodies – indicated as 
an important deterrent in rational choice and deterrence 
theories of criminality. 22% felt that other companies would 
not want to do business with them or employ them meaning 
that some informal social control systems may also exist 
across industries.
However, 78% - nearly four out of five respondents - did 
not think they would face this consequence. This raises 
questions about the extent to which business actors 
implicated in bribery and corruption are able to move 
across companies. This may be because they do not need 
to disclose a bribery breach as a cause of termination of 
employment; because there may not be enough vetting 
procedures across companies; or, as the literature has 
shown, because the causes for dismissal or disciplinary 
action may be subject to a confidentiality agreement (if 
company systems and controls were also at fault). Further 
research is needed to tease out these variables and the 
extent to which companies vet new employees with regard 
to their ABC history.
What do you think would happen to an employee at your company if they became involved 
in bribery?
Chart 20
Respondents were also asked about how likely it was that 
someone would get away with paying a bribe on behalf of 
their company. The data in Chart 22 indicate that 30% of our 
respondents, almost one in three, considered it to be likely 
that the bribe payer would get away with this. 
We further probed the respondents who answered that 
they considered it to be certain, very likely or likely, to 
determine why they thought it would be possible to get 
away with paying a bribe (Chart 23). Of these respondents, 
25% indicated that this would be due to poor monitoring 
by direct managers, 18% because they felt that it is an 
accepted or tolerated practice in the industry, 16% because 
there is no real threat of enforcement action by a regulator, 
13% because their company is very complex and difficult 
to monitor, and 9% because their anti-bribery compliance 
policies are not very clear. 
These answers reveal a mix of factors internal and external 
to companies, including formal monitoring and sanctioning 
and more esoteric issues such as industry culture. This 
complicates approaches to remedying the situation, but 
also highlights certain possible approaches and guidelines: 
training of direct managers in proper monitoring of ABC 
compliance; simplifying the monitoring and escalation of 
decision-making (though companies may continue to be 
complex, the distribution of roles, responsibilities and lines 
of reporting regarding ABC monitoring can be simplified and 
made more focused); and paying more attention to clarify, 
simplify and make ABC compliance policies more accessible. 
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What consequences would they face?
Chart 21
How likely is it that someone would get away with paying a bribe on behalf of your 
company?
Chart 22
Why would they be able to get away with paying a bribe?
Chart 23
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Empirical understanding of the issues in this section has an 
increasing significance given recent legal developments. In 
several jurisdictions, offences now exist (either criminal or 
administrative) that directly correlate to whether a company 
possesses a culture of compliance. For instance, the UK 
adopts a criminal law approach as the Section 7 offence of 
the Bribery Act 2010 criminalises failures by commercial 
organisations to prevent bribery. The rationale for this 
offence was put forward by the Law Commission review 
into reforming bribery in 2008 where it was stated that 
‘such failures…are a key factor in the perpetuation of the 
practice of bribery. This is especially (but not solely) the case 
when bribery takes place in environments where there is, 
or is believed to be, a “culture” of bribe-taking’11.  In another 
example, Germany has adopted a similar administrative 
offence since there is no corporate criminal responsibility 
for corruption and instances of bribery are tackled through 
administrative fines. Legal entities commit an administrative 
offence if the management has intentionally or negligently 
not adequately fulfilled supervisory measures that are 
necessary to prevent bribery by employees or agents of that 
company12.  A company may be fined irrespective of whether 
or not an individual is held criminally liable thus showing the 
extensive reach of these provisions. 
These legal developments have symbolic and practical 
importance. They foreground the culture of the corporation 
and shift focus onto the ‘organisational component’ that 
makes the bribery possible. Underpinning this is the need 
to understand (and change) the cognitive (i.e. how people 
think), affective (i.e. how people feel), and behavioural (i.e. 
how people act) responses of corporate actors towards 
opportunities for criminality within their operating contexts. 
For anti-bribery procedures to be ‘adequate’, we must 
understand these dynamics and how pro-corruption 
narratives are produced and reproduced. 
19
2. BRIBERY OPPORTUNITIES AND 
RISKS
For bribery to occur, an opportunity must be present. 
However, it is not the mere presence of an opportunity 
that is important, but the particular characteristics of the 
opportunity; bribery in (international) business, like all 
forms of white-collar crime, has what is referred to as 
an ‘opportunity structure’13.  This is a set of conditions or 
elements that must be in place in order for the bribery 
to take place. Different settings naturally create different 
opportunities that vary in accessibility and attractiveness to 
would-be-offenders.
Understanding the ‘opportunity structure’ is important for 
the implementation of robust and ‘adequate’ compliance 
procedures, in line with Section 7 of the Bribery Act 
2010. For such procedures to have a reductive and/or 
preventative influence, we must understand and identify 
the opportunities for bribery and recognise the processes 
by which bribery opportunities are realised. This implies two 
analytically separable questions:
1. How does bribery occur? (crime – the specific event)
2. Why does bribery occur? (criminality – the underlying 
motivations and conditions)
In this section, we address how crime opportunities are 
formed by immediate environments and then discovered 
and evaluated by potential offenders. That is, how do 
those employees that are motivated to bribe come across 
opportunities and situations that are conducive to bribery, 
and to what extent is there a lack of credible oversight at 
any given time and in any given place. For instance, much 
research has indicated that gaps sometimes exist in business 
between the official and expected ways of behaving in line 
with public normative standards (i.e. the myth system) and 
the shadow norms, values and rules that tolerate bribery 
(i.e. the operational code)14.   Bribery within business may 
simultaneously be ‘normal’ (i.e. a rational response to the 
strains/pressures of business) and ‘deviant’ in that it violates 
formal norms, laws and regulations. Thus, the understanding 
of patterns of behaviour that may indicate likely areas of 
corruption is beneficial for the development of ABC policies 
and procedures.
Criminological research informs us that criminals become 
aware of opportunities as they engage in their normal, 
routine business activities, and come across those who 
expect bribes, or are willing to receive bribes, in familiar 
business practices. This is important because bribery is 
reliant on legitimate business practices, as bribes can be 
conveniently concealed behind the otherwise legitimate 
occupational behaviours of the bribers’ occupations. This 
makes both detection and proof to a criminal standard of 
certainty difficult for regulators and compliance actors and 
for the criminal courts. Understanding how opportunities 
emerge in this way has implications for ‘adequate 
procedures’ in terms of how would-be ‘bribers’ gain access 
to bribery opportunities and confront problems of gaining 
finance, gaining access to foreign officials, and so on.
In this section we place attention not on the incidence or 
occurrence of ‘actual’ bribery within business, but on better 
understanding the conditions that create the ‘potential’ 
for bribery to take place, that is, the ‘causal potential.’ 
The absence of actual bribery is not an indicator of future 
behaviours, thus any robust and systematic approach to the 
implementation of ‘adequate procedures’ must be based on 
an understanding of how opportunities for bribery emerge 
and the underlying generative conditions that create these. 
It is an understanding of the latter that can inform forward-
looking and preventative procedures. 
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2.1 Opportunities for bribery
The questions in this section were directed to all participants 
in the sample, yet they were adapted to the particularities 
of those working in legal or compliance roles and those 
working in any other roles within the organisation – for 
example, sales, marketing, business development, 
procurement, accounting (see Methodology section for all 
the roles represented by the respondent group).
Respondents in legal/compliance roles were asked whether 
they thought it would be possible for someone in their 
company to offer a bribe to a public official to obtain/retain 
preferential treatment. Respondents in non-legal/compliance 
roles were asked whether they thought it would be possible 
for someone in their role to offer such bribes (Chart 24). 
39% of those respondents in non-legal/compliance roles (i.e. 
sales, marketing etc.) indicated that they thought it would 
definitely or probably be possible for someone in their role 
to offer a bribe to a public official for preferential treatment. 
That is, almost two out of five respondents in these positions 
recognise opportunities for bribery in the course of their 
roles. This indicates that conducive structures for bribery 
exist across businesses. 
In contrast, 25% of those in legal/compliance roles indicated 
that they thought it would definitely or probably be possible 
for someone in their company to offer a bribe to a public 
official for preferential treatment. While these two sets 
of respondents are not directly comparable in terms of 
their companies, in that there is no way for us to establish 
whether they work for the same company, these data 
indicate that those in non-legal/compliance roles generally 
consider it to be more possible for opportunities for bribing 
to be recognised. This perhaps reflects how well these actors 
have access to knowledge on opportunities for bribery in 
the course of their job role, while those that work in legal/
compliance do not necessarily possess such knowledge.
Focused research would be needed to directly compare this 
within organisations – and this would be an important area 
to explore: the difference in the perception of the existence/
nature of opportunities for bribery between staff in roles 
where those opportunities could present themselves and 
staff in compliance roles.
Would it be possible for someone in your company or role to offer a bribe to a public official to obtain/retain preferential treatment?
Chart 24
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To explore the dynamics of bribery opportunities further, 
those who answered ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ to this 
question were asked how regularly they would encounter 
such opportunities and in what situations they would arise 
(Charts 25 and 26). Most respondents in both non-legal/
compliance (30%) and legal/compliance (33%) roles believe 
opportunities to offer a bribe are encountered every 6-12 
months. However, some of our respondents indicated that 
such opportunities can arise on a more regular basis, and 
even daily. The poorer understanding by legal/compliance 
respondents of opportunities for bribery in comparison to 
respondents in non-legal/compliance roles is also indicated 
by the response of these actors to how regularly such 
opportunities emerge as 28% of this category selected ‘don’t 
know’. It is worth exploring further whether those working 
in compliance functions require a better understanding of 
the day-to-day activities of company employees in order to 
provide more effective compliance geared towards reducing 
opportunities for bribery.
When we further probed our respondents to gain insights 
into when employees in their role would encounter 
opportunities to bribe, 40% of those in non-legal/compliance 
roles and 50% of those in legal/compliance roles indicated 
that these opportunities arise routinely during existing 
business relationships. This is an important finding as 
it reinforces that bribery does not take place outside of 
‘normal business practice’, but is more likely to occur due 
to opportunities that arise as part of the daily activities of 
business actors.
How regularly would someone in your role or company encounter opportunities to offer a bribe?
Chart 25
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We then asked respondents to assess to what extent they 
agreed or disagreed with a number of statements that were 
designed to explore their understanding of, and views on, 
how bribery is carried out. Chart 27 shows the answers for 
those in non-legal/compliance roles who said that it would 
definitely or probably be possible to offer a bribe in their 
role. As can be seen, 83% of these respondents agreed that 
someone in their role would possess the knowledge of how 
to make a bribe; 59% agreed that the process of giving a 
bribe involves well-known, common business practices; 56% 
agreed that a bribe would be easily concealed behind the 
company’s routine business practices; 53% agreed that a 
bribe would be arranged with the assistance of colleagues; 
and 51% agreed that a bribe would be arranged with 
assistance from a third party.
In terms of the ‘opportunity structures’, we can see that a 
set of conditions exist that create potential for bribery to 
take place in business. For instance, those business actors 
that encounter opportunities to bribe as part of their routine 
duties are also likely to possess the required knowledge, 
expertise and social networks for arranging the bribery.
When would someone in your role or company encounter opportunities to offer a bribe?
Chart 26
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Chart 27
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Building further on Chart 27, all respondents were asked 
whether they thought a bribe could be easily concealed 
within their company. Chart 28 shows the answers for all 
respondents, for those in companies with 5,000 or fewer 
employees, and for those in companies with more than 
5,000 employees.
32% of all our respondents think that a bribe could 
definitely or probably be concealed within their company 
with ease. This in itself is a substantial number. If we break 
the respondents down by company size then we can see 
that in companies with 5000 or fewer employees 35% of 
respondents believe that a bribe could definitely or probably 
be concealed within their company with ease; while in 
companies with more than 5000 employees, 24% of the 
respondents think that a bribe could definitely or probably 
be concealed within their company with ease. Therefore, 
respondents in smaller companies are more likely to 
think that a bribe could be easily concealed than those in 
larger companies. While companies with more than 5000 
employees may also by definition be more complex in terms 
of structure, with more opportunities to conceal a bribe, 
these companies may also have more developed monitoring 
systems that make concealment more challenging.
Respondents were also asked how common they thought 
bribes and facilitation payments were in their industry 
(Chart 29). The majority of respondents thought that bribes 
and facilitation payments were rare or very rare in their 
industry. However, a substantial proportion perceived both 
bribery and facilitation payments to be commonplace: 38% 
of respondents think bribes are commonplace within their 
industry and 32% think facilitations payments are common 
in their industry. The respondents who thought bribes were 
rare, very rare or non-existent, were then asked why they 
thought this was the case (Chart 30). The primary reason 
given was that involvement in bribery allegations would 
threaten the company’s reputation (53%). These respondents 
also indicated further reasons for their opinion: companies 
have improved their compliance systems and controls 
(47%), the industry recognises bribery is wrong (45%), and 
bribery is more likely to be discovered (45%). Preventing 
employees acting upon bribery opportunities is therefore 
premised upon a mix of company-level and industry-level 
factors. While changing perceptions in the industry may 
be beyond the capabilities of individual companies within 
them, resources should be targeted at the company-level in 
improving compliance systems and increasing perceptions 
of negative reputational costs and likely discovery of 
noncompliance.
Do you think a bribe could be easily concealed within your company?
Chart 28
How commonplace do you think bribes/facilitation payments are in your industry?
Chart 29
Why do you think bribes are rare or non-existent in your industry?
Chart 30
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2.2 Bribery risk
Respondents were asked to assess the level at which 
different factors presented a bribery risk to their company, 
ranking the risk from 0 to 10, where 0 = no risk and 10 = 
very high risk. Chart 31 illustrates the mean score each 
factor was given by the respondents and the range of scores 
given15.  Respondents indicated that working in countries 
where bribery is common presents the highest bribery risk 
to their company, followed by using agents or consultants 
and the use of corporate hospitality, gifts and entertainment. 
This finding corresponds with the extant literature and 
enforcement data on foreign bribery where we see local 
cultures, third parties and the ambiguity surrounding 
hospitality as concerns for business. 
On the basis that large payments being made/received by 
companies could constitute a bribery risk, respondents were 
asked about the level of supervision over large payments 
in their company (Chart 32). A substantial majority of 
respondents (87%) believe that such payments are always 
fully (67%) or sometimes (20%) monitored. This is an 
example of good corporate practice in terms of internal ABC 
compliance provisions.
To what extent do you think the following present a bribery risk to your company? 
Chart 31
How much supervision is there over large payments being made/received by your 
company?
Chart 32
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2.3 Attitudes to bribery
Respondents were asked whether they thought that 
businesses that paid bribes within their industry sector 
would gain a commercial advantage (Chart 33). Interestingly, 
the responses were relatively evenly split between yes 
(39%), no (35%) and ‘don’t know’ (26%). This indicates a lack 
of common understanding over whether bribes equate 
to commercial advantages in their industries. However, if 
we break these data down by industry sector, we can see 
that three industry sectors had a higher percentage of ‘yes’ 
answers to this question: construction, pharmaceuticals/
healthcare and real estate16. 
Respondents were then asked whether they thought that 
people who paid bribes on behalf of their company could 
personally benefit (Chart 34). Almost half of our respondents 
(48%) indicated that they thought that those people who pay 
bribes on behalf of a company could also benefit personally.
Those respondents who believed that a personal benefit was 
possible were asked what form such a benefit could take 
(Chart 35). Of note here is that 64% of these respondents 
think that individuals that pay bribes on behalf of the 
company would be given special status following their 
success in bringing in contracts. In addition, 60% think 
that these individuals would be promoted for meeting 
the company targets. A number of the respondents who 
Do you think that businesses that pay bribes have a commercial advantage in your 
industry?
Chart 33
Could people that pay bribes on behalf of the company personally benefit?
Chart 34
In what ways do you think individuals that pay bribes on behalf of the company could 
personally benefit?
Chart 35
selected ‘other’ highlighted the financial benefits that could 
be gained by individuals that pay bribes, for example earning 
‘more commission’ or ‘bigger bonuses’, receiving ‘kickbacks’ 
or ‘side money’, or getting ‘their fee as a remuneration 
under agency agreements’. This is an important finding 
since it shows how individuals may be motivated to act 
upon bribery opportunities due to the complex interaction 
between company-level and individual-level benefits. Paying 
bribes improves both company and individual performance 
targets. A recommendation would be that procedures should 
be instilled internally for better due diligence and more 
extensive scrutiny of how certain individuals achieve these 
targets. Successful contracts, especially in larger sums or 
in difficult business and industry circumstances should be 
subjected to some form of internal review for impropriety. 
Finally, respondents were asked about their personal 
attitudes to bribery (Chart 36). An overwhelming majority 
(80%) believe that it is never acceptable to bribe. However, 
although a small proportion, it is interesting to note that 
some respondents believe that it is always acceptable to 
bribe (3%), or that it can be acceptable if it helps get new 
business (6%), or that it is not acceptable but cannot be 
avoided (11%).
What is your personal attitude towards bribery? 
Chart 36
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3. THIRD PARTIES
It is now recognised that the use of third parties is a common 
feature in many cases of foreign bribery. For instance, an 
OECD report based on an analysis of all enforcement data 
in relation to the Anti-Bribery Convention 1998 indicated 
that intermediaries, or third-parties, were involved in three 
out of four bribery cases17.  These intermediaries take 
many forms, such as local agents or corporate vehicles 
and subsidiary companies. The importance of third parties 
as intermediaries in foreign bribery is related to multiple 
factors: for many companies that wish to penetrate a new 
foreign market, it will be necessary to engage local partners 
that have access to local business opportunities. Further, 
in some industries, the business model of the company is 
predicated upon employing third parties. For example, in the 
wholesale insurance sector, the retention of new business 
is commonly devolved to local agents that then seek out 
insurance contracts with locally-based businesses. This is a 
cheaper method of conducting business. The necessity and 
profitability of using third parties poses significant bribery 
risks. 
In this part of the survey, we explored the extent of exposure 
to, and ways of dealing with, the bribery risks associated with 
using third parties. We asked our respondents if they were 
involved with engaging third parties, with three possible 
answers:
• No: 79 (31%)
• Yes, in a business context: 116 (46%)
• Yes, in a legal/compliance context: 57 (23%)
Those that are involved with engaging third parties in some 
way were then asked a series of related follow up questions, 
with different questions for those involved in a business 
context and those involved in a legal/compliance context.
3.1 Risks of using third parties
Respondents involved in engaging third parties in a business 
context were asked questions about the risks posed by third 
parties in relation to bribery, and what they did to mitigate 
these risks. 60 of the 116 (52%) respondents involved in 
engaging third parties in a business context think about 
bribery risk when doing so at least sometimes (Chart 37).
Do you think about bribery risk when engaging third parties?
Chart 37
However, 48% of respondents involved in engaging third 
parties in a business context do not often or never think 
about bribery risk when doing so – this shows a lack of 
understanding of the risks associated with third parties. This 
finding contradicts the previously outlined finding that the 
respondents considered the engagement of third parties to 
be the second most significant bribery risk to the company. 
This means that while there may be a general understanding 
that using agents or consultants poses bribery risks, in 
practice, company insiders do not always check for bribery 
risks in specific cases of engaging them. Furthermore, there 
is a slight discrepancy between those in a compliance/
legal role and those in sales or other business roles in 
how they assessed this question. The first group (legal/
compliance roles) gave a median score of 5.3 on the risks 
of engaging third parties, while the second group (business 
roles) gave a median of 4.3. Though the difference is small 
in relative numbers, the finding still indicates that those 
in a compliance role (i.e. who did not answer the question 
on whether they thought of bribery risks in engaging third 
parties) understand and give more weight to such risks. 
There should be a focus on developing internal company 
procedures to bridge this gap and target the policies and 
guidance on third party risks to the most critical areas of the 
company structure.  
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Those respondents that answered Always, Often or 
Sometimes as the rate of frequency at which they think 
of bribery risks when engaging third parties, were then 
asked to rank different factors in the order of importance in 
influencing their decision to check third parties. The overall 
rank they were given was:
1. The third party is based in or will be operating in a high 
risk country
2. You have a suspicion that the third party might pay 
bribes
3. You have seen or heard about allegations of bribery with 
this third party
4. The third party is a type of organisation that is known to 
present a bribery risk
As with Chart 31, we see here that the defining factor as to 
whether to check a third party is whether the country was 
assessed as high risk in terms of bribery.
Respondents who are involved in engaging third parties in a 
business context were asked to assess the extent to which 
certain factors pose a bribery risk to their company, ranking 
the risk from 0 to 10, where 0 = no risk and 10 = very high 
risk (Chart 38). Chart 38 shows the mean score each factor 
was given by the respondents and the range of scores 
given18. 
In Chart 38 we see that respondents considered those third 
parties with a reputation for paying bribes as well as third 
parties that are paid in cash as posing the highest risk. While 
all the factors were ranked as posing a high risk, at the 
lower end respondents indicated that not having an existing 
relationship is considered the lowest risk. This finding 
suggests a need to emphasise the importance of conducting 
due diligence when starting a new business relationship 
with a third party. If the company does not have an already 
existing relationship with the third party, and due diligence 
has not already been conducted, this should caution towards 
being more critical of that new relationship as a potential 
bribery risk.
To what extent do you think the following pose a bribery risk for your company when engaging third parties?
Chart 38
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3.2 Procedures related to the use of third parties
The respondents who are involved in engaging third parties 
in a business context, and who consider the risks from third 
parties at least some of the time, were asked what checks 
they would make when considering engaging third parties 
(Chart 39). Most notably, our respondents indicated that 
searching the internet to check any reports about bribery 
and corruption relating to a third party (54%) and asking 
legal/compliance to undertake due diligence and provide a 
report on the third party (54%) are the most used checks. 
Respondents that stated that they had a list of questions 
that they ask, ask these questions either of every third party 
(76%) or just if there are any concerns (24%). Importantly, 
40% of the respondents stated that they would request 
information form the third party on their approach to 
bribery and corruption. This can be considered good practice 
as it instils an active approach on behalf of company insiders 
in which third parties are probed about compliance in their 
own practices. However, this would not be enough, and 
good practice would involve a combination of their own 
due diligence practices, and an additional layer of internal 
checks by the legal/compliance department. Worryingly, 17% 
of the respondents never conduct checks for bribery risks 
when engaging third parties. This should be considered an 
unacceptably high number, bearing in mind the extent of 
bribery risk posed by third parties. The situation could be 
remedied by introducing company policies and practices 
of compulsory checks, along the lines of those highlighted 
Chart 39, in every circumstance of employing third parties, 
as well as organising training for staff to impart due diligence 
attitudes and skills. 
What checks do you make when considering engaging a third party?
Chart 39
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Respondents were then asked to what extent certain 
procedures or practices protect against bribery when 
engaging third parties, on a scale of 1 to 10, where 0 = no 
protection and 10 = maximum protection (Chart 40). Chart 
40 shows the mean score each procedure/practice was given 
by the respondents and the range of scores given19.  
Our respondents indicated that carrying out due diligence 
into the third party was the mechanism that offered the 
highest level of protection against bribery. However, all 
mechanisms were considered of a relatively high level of 
protection.
Respondents who are involved in engaging third parties in 
a legal/compliance context were also asked to what extent 
certain procedures or practices protect against bribery, 
on the same scale as above (Chart 41). Chart 41 shows the 
mean score each procedure/practice was given by these 
respondents and the range of scores given20.  As above, 
carrying out due diligence was considered to offer the 
highest level of protection although again, all mechanisms 
were rated as offering a high level of protection. This 
indicates that there is a need to employ a mix of methods 
of assessing and mitigating the risks posed by third parties. 
Again, the best practice would involve a combination 
of individual due diligence and the involvement of the 
compliance team at some stage of the proceedings – 
preferably throughout the process of decision-making 
though certainly at the point of authorisation. This would 
enable a second-tier scrutiny of the decision to employ the 
third-party by the compliance team.
To what extent do you think the following protect against bribery?
Chart 40
To what extent do you think the following protect against bribery?
Chart 41
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Charts 42 to 45 show the answers to questions asked of 
respondents who engage third parties in a legal/compliance 
context. As can be seen, 70% of respondents indicated that 
they are at least sometimes asked to advise on bribery and 
corruption risk when the company engages with a third party 
(Chart 42). This is an important finding as it shows business 
attitudes that recognise the role played by the compliance 
team in ensuring proper business operations. However, a 
substantial proportion of respondents (40%) also indicated 
that they at least sometimes feel under pressure to approve 
third party engagements despite ABC red flags. While the 
previous finding is encouraging, this may indicate that the 
extensive involvement of compliance may on occasion be 
merely ‘cosmetic’ rather than substantive. The finding calls 
for putting in place proper training procedures for staff 
in business roles that will increase their understanding of 
the role of compliance teams. Good practice would be also 
include ensuring that management sends out messages of 
support for the compliance team, as well as enabling easy 
and accessible reporting systems for compliance officers 
in cases where they feel under pressure – a type of a 
compliance ‘whistleblowing’ mechanism.
96% of respondents indicated that they think employees 
correctly follow due diligence procedures when engaging 
third parties. This is a positive perception that perhaps 
indicates good practice within these companies. Finally, 
86% of these respondents indicated that they are at least 
‘satisfied’ with the procedures currently in place for due 
diligence of third parties within their companies.
How often are you asked to advise on bribery and corruption risk when the company 
engages a third party?
Chart 42
How often do you feel under pressure to approve the engagement of a third party despite 
bribery and corruption red flags?
Chart 43
Do you think employees correctly follow due diligence procedures when engaging third 
parties?
Chart 44
How satisfied are you with the procedures currently in place for due diligence of third 
parties?
Chart 45
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METHODOLOGY
The survey was developed and conducted by members 
of the White & Case LLP White-Collar Crime team and 
researchers from the Centre for Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, University of Manchester. The research was carried 
out from March 2017 to January 2018 and it consisted of 3 
phases:
Phase 1: Planning and survey development 
The first 6 months of the project involved the development 
of an online questionnaire to be distributed to potential 
respondents working in multinational businesses, in a 
range of industry sectors, anywhere in the world. The 
survey was developed through collaboration between 
White & Case LLP and researchers from the University of 
Manchester, and feedback was provided on early versions 
of the questionnaire by academics with expertise on bribery 
and corruption or survey research methods, and White 
& Case LLP global partners. In addition, a pilot survey 
was conducted with 16 respondents in July 2017 and the 
responses and feedback on the questionnaire were used to 
develop the final version.
Phase 2: Data collection
The survey was launched on the 4th September 2017 
and data was collected over the following three months. 
The survey was distributed to potential respondents via 
a number of different methods: direct email contact to 
relevant companies; social media campaign; promotion at 
relevant conferences and events; use of panel data company 
to target relevant respondents. 
Phase 3: Analysis and write-up
The final stage of the project involved analysis of the 
quantitative survey data and the production of this report. 
The Survey 
The online survey consisted of 82 questions in total. 
However, the survey was designed so that it could be 
completed by individuals in different organisational roles 
and with different experiences regarding the questions 
(for example, some questions asked an initial yes/no 
answer. This would then be followed by a question). 
Therefore, respondents did not answer all 82 questions; the 
questionnaire adapted to each respondent based on their 
answers to particular questions. 
The scope of the survey was kept broad and inclusive, 
allowing for respondents from a wide range of industry 
sectors (see Chart 57), with different roles, positions and 
responsibilities within their organisation (see Charts 53-
56), and based and operating in any part of the world (see 
Charts 58-60). This ensured representation of a variety of 
businesses across a range of locations around the world, 
as well as the ability to make cross-comparisons across 
different sectors.
The survey was divided into 4 sections, aiming to gather 
information and perspectives on:
1. the respondent’s role and experience, the nature of their 
organisation, and the market in which it operated;
2. anti-bribery policies and procedures within their 
organisation and industry;
3.  bribery opportunities and risks within their organisation 
and industry; and
4. the role of third-parties in their business practices. 
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The respondents
The survey was completed by 252 respondents, 65% of 
whom were male and 34% female, covering a range of age 
groups.
Respondents were asked to categorise their role and 
position within the company in a number of ways -primary 
responsibility; committees they sat on; length of time in 
organisation; management level. 
As Chart 50 shows, the respondent group was divided 
between those who were at the senior management level 
(36%), middle-level management (39%), and those with no 
management responsibilities. The number of people who 
reported to them ranged from 0 to over 100, with a median 
number of direct reports of 4.
Age
Chart 46
What is your primary responsibility?
Chart 47
Which committee(s) do you sit on?
(‘Other’ committees highlighted by respondents included disciplinary, safety, trade and accounting 
committees)
Chart 48
Length of time in organisation
Chart 49
Level
Chart 50
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The Businesses
The nature of the businesses in which the respondents 
worked varied considerably, with companies based and 
operating in various jurisdictions, in a range of industry 
sectors, and of different size, structure and position in the 
market.
Industry sector
Chart 51
Location of respondents
Chart 52
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Location of company headquarters
Chart 53
Business presence
(Shows the percentage of respondents whose company operates in these regions.)
Chart 54
Annual turnover
Chart 55
35
Number of employees
Chart 56
Organisational structure
Chart 57
Current market environment
Chart 58
Performance within market
Chart 59
Current financial position
Chart 60
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